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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine whether and, 
if so, how far, the Augustinian notion of malum is related to 
Plotinus’ concept of evil, as it appears in Ennead I. 8 [51]. 
The Augustinian notion of evil will be analyzed by focusing 
on the De natura boni, considering plurality and unity in 
Augustine’s identification of malum and nihil, both in their 
ontological and axiological dimensions. Topics selected for 
special consideration will be, first, evil as lack of modus, spe-
cies and ordo naturalis (De nat. b., 4), and, secondly, corruptio 
as cause of defectio boni (De nat. b., 6). The second part will 
analyze Plotinus’ notion of evil, as spelled out in Ennead I, 8 
[51], considering the Plotinian identity of to kakon and me 
on. Topics selected for analysis will be, first, the concept of 
evil as lack of measure, form and order (Enn. I. 8. 3), and 
secondly, the notion of to kakon as lack of good (Enn. I. 8. 
5) simpliciter.  The third part of this paper will consider the 
differences between Augustine’s and Plotinus’ identity of evil 
and non-being, as related to the notion of matter. Topics se-
lected for analysis will be, firstly, Plotinus’ identity of matter 
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and evil (Enn. I. 8. 10), and, secondly, Augustine’s concept of 
matter as capacitas formarum (De nat. b., 18). The conclusion 
will bring out how Plotinus’ concept of steresis suggests both 
a different relation between evil and non-being while being 
closely resembling Augustine’s pattern of malum and nihil.
Keywords: Augustine, Plotinus, matter, evil, non-being.
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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine Augustine’s 
reflections concerning the concept of evil, in order to 
identify whether – and to what extent – Augustine’s 
notion of malum is related to Plotinus’ concept of 
evil. This will be done by examining the Augustinian 
and Plotinian identification of evil and non-being 
as it appears in Ennead I. 8 and in De Natura Boni. 
More specifically, this study will first consider the 
similarities between the Augustinian and the Plotin-
ian ontological-axiological patterns and define their 
specific features. Then, by looking at the concepts 
of evil that emerge from Augustine and Plotinus, it 
will examine the notions of non-being and matter 
as they are exposed in Ennead I. 8 and in De Natura 
Boni. Ultimately, this paper will demonstrate that 
Plotinus’ notion of evil as steresis is akin to Augus-
tine’s concept of evil as defectus boni, confirming 
the theoretical relationship between Augustine’s and 
Plotinus’ idea of evil.1
1. Augustine’s identification of malum and 
nihil
The basic elements with which to examine Augus-
tine’s identification of malum and nihil first appear in 
his reflections, which are exposed in De Natura boni 
and concern the different kinds of goods and their 
constitutive features. In the taxonomy of goodness 
Augustine recognizes two classes of good beings 
endowed with a different axiological status, that is 
the highest good (God) on the one hand and great 
and small goods (souls and bodies) on the other 
hand. Augustine identifies the source of goodness 
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in smaller goods with God’s creation, which thus 
becomes the source of both the existence and good-
ness of creatures: 
The Supreme Good, than which there is none higher, is 
God; for this reason He is immutable good, and there-
fore truly eternal and truly immortal. All other goods 
are from Him alone, but not of His substance. For that 
which is of His substance is identical with Himself, but 
the things which He has made are not what He Himself 
is. It follows that, if He alone is immutable, all the things 
which He has made, inasmuch as He has made them out 
of nothing, are mutable. For He is so almighty, that even 
out of nothing, that is, out of that which is utterly non-
-existent, He can make goods both great and small, both 
celestial and terrestrial, both spiritual and corporeal.2 
(AUGUSTINE, 1955, 1, trans. by A.A. Moon)
Nevertheless, in his analysis Augustine does not 
simply state that the source of smaller goods (that is, 
souls and bodies) is God’s creation, but also stresses 
that all beings are goods: “Inasmuch, therefore, as 
all goods whether great or small, whatever be their 
rank in the hierarchy of beings, can have exist-
ence only from God, and since, moreover, every 
nature is a good in so far as it is a nature, every 
nature can be only from the supreme and true God” 
(AUGUSTINE, 1955, 1).3 In order to understand the 
reason for such a total identification between beings 
and goods we have to understand what, according to 
Augustine, is the origin of the goodness of what is 
created. In De Natura Boni he clearly states that the 
axiological value of beings derives from the extent 
to which they are in accordance with their measure, 
form and order: 
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For we Catholic Christians worship God, from Whom 
are all goods whether great or small, from Whom is 
every measure whether great or small, from Whom 
is every form whether great or small, from Whom is 
every order whether great or small. For certainly the 
more things possess of measure, form, and order, the 
better they are; but the less things possess of measure, 
form, and order the less good they are.4 (AUGUSTINE, 
1955, 3. trans. slightly modified)
As this excerpt shows, the creation of goods cor-
responds to the creation of the principles of the 
goodness of beings. 
Although these reflections explain what Augustine 
considers as the cause of the goodness of creatures, 
what still remains to be understood is the reason 
why all beings are goods. In order to do that we have 
to examine what Augustine says about the measure, 
form and order of beings, which shows that the prin-
ciples of the goodness of beings are also the reason 
for their different degree of existence: 
Where these three are great [i.e. measure, form and 
order], there are great goods; where they are small, 
there are small goods; where they are absent, good is 
absent. Again, where these three are great, there are 
great natures; where they are small, there are small 
natures; where they are non-existent, there is no na-
ture. Therefore every nature is good.5 (AUGUSTINE, 
1955, 3)
As we can see from Augustine’s words the bet-
ter things are measured, formed and ordered, the 
higher their ontological and axiological degree is. 
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To understand the reason for such a relationship 
between the ontological and axiological dimen-
sions of natures we have to consider that measure, 
form and order are not simply accidents of beings 
but correspond to the essence of beings.6 Thus, as 
principles of the existence of beings, they are at the 
same time the reason for their perfection (perfectio) 
and for their goodness. 
Hence, if measure, form and order of natures are 
the cause of their existence and goodness, then there 
cannot be any evil nature among them (Augustine, 
1955, 4). As every being is indeed endowed with 
measure, form and order, it is in itself perfect – 
therefore, good.7 If beings are in themselves good, 
it follows that evil corresponds to the non-being. 
In order to understand this we need to examine the 
plurality and unity of Augustine’s identification of 
malum and nihil. In the light of the consideration 
concerning the relationship between the existence 
and goodness of beings we note first that evil cor-
responds to the corruption (corruptio) of measure, 
form and order: “Evil is nothing else than the cor-
ruption of the measure, the form, or the order of 
a nature” (Augustine, 1955, 4. trans. slightly modi-
fied).8 Indeed, if natures are what they are in virtue 
of the principles that produce their perfection, evil 
will correspond to the lack of them – therefore, to 
the non-being understood as their privatio.9 As we 
learn from Augustine’s own words, evil is in that first 
meaning the non-being, understood here as the lack 
of the essence – therefore, of the existence of beings. 
Having thus defined evil, Augustine analyses the 
source of that lack of good. Indeed, if every being is 
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in itself endowed with measure, form and order, then 
evil, as the lack of these three elements, is not some-
thing that belongs to beings. What causes the lack of 
perfection of creatures is, according to Augustine, the 
movement of corruption of measure, form and order 
which, by decreasing their goodness, concurrently de-
creases their ontological degree: “If corruption should 
remove from corruptible things all measure, all form, 
and all order, no nature would remain” (Augustine, 
1955, 6. trans. slightly modified).10 So, if all natures 
are good, evil corresponds to the ontological lack 
produced by corruption, which appears now as the 
movement in itself and not as an axiological form of 
it. To such an understanding of the reasons of the lack 
of measure, form and order of natures Augustine adds 
a reflection concerning the cause of movement that 
is essential in order to identify the group of elements 
related to his identification of malum and nihil. By 
examining the source of movement Augustine stresses 
that it corresponds to the nothingness out of which 
all natures are made: “Therefore, then, of whatsoever 
measure, of whatsoever form, of whatsoever order 
they are, they are such because God has made them; 
but they are not immutable, because they have been 
made from nothing” (Augustine, 1955, 10. trans. 
slightly modified).11 As shown by his reflections evil, 
as a lack of good, is the lack of existence produced by 
corruptio. This one is the product of the nothingness 
out of which things are created.
It is important to stress that the ontological-axi-
ological pattern of Augustine’s concept of evil does 
not emerge only in his reflections concerning evil as 
being but at the same time in the ones devoted to sin. 
Considering the results of moral evil Augustine states 
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that they correspond to the corruption of human be-
ings’ measure, form and order (1955, 7).12 Thus sin, as 
action, corresponds to the movement of corruption 
– therefore, to a decrease of the ontological and axi-
ological degree of human beings’ nature. Augustine 
considers the lack of control on the desires of the soul 
and the body as the origin of such a movement of 
corruption,13 suggesting that nothingness is the origin 
of evil and that evil corresponds to the corruption of 
the essential features of beings.
In the light of these findings concerning the 
concept of evil we can now consider their ontolog-
ical-axiological pattern. As already noticed in the 
reflections concerning the goodness of beings the 
measure, form and order of natures are the sources 
of both the existence and perfection (perfectio) of 
natures. Thus in such a perspective evil is, first, the 
lack of the essential elements of beings; therefore, 
it corresponds to the non-being as a lack of exist-
ence. Moreover, as measure, form and order are the 
sources of the existence of natures, evil (as defectus 
boni) will correspond to the result of that lessening 
of quantity or level (corruptio). As a cause of this 
lessened axiological perfection of natures Augustine 
indicates the nothingness (nihil) out of which crea-
tures are made, outlining an ontological-axiological 
pattern where evil is the non-being produced by 
corruptio. This one appears as a result of the noth-
ingness out of which beings are created. Thus in 
Augustine’s reflections evil emerges as the lack of 
existence produced by the movement originated 
from the non-being. On the contrary, the goodness 
of natures requires the permanence of measure, 
form and order (Augustine, 1955, 37).
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2. Plotinus’ identification of evil and of 
the non-being
In order to understand what Plotinus identifies as 
evil and non-being we need to examine first what is 
related to the statement of the problem. His reflec-
tions on Evil start indeed from the need to define 
Evil’s nature, as this point is decisive to determine 
what kind of beings Evil may affect and whether it 
has or has not an Authentic-Existence (1966, I. 8 [51]. 
1).14 In order to do that we have to know what Good 
is, because the nature of Evil is opposite to that of 
Good and at the same time because the knowledge of 
opposites is one and only: “But if, because opposites 
are known by one and the same kind of knowledge 
and evil is opposite to good, the knowledge of good 
will also be knowledge of evil, then those who mean 
to know evils must have a clear perception of good” 
(PLOTINUS, 1966, I. 8 [51]. 1).15 In such a perspec-
tive Plotinus examines what Good is, explaining that 
Good is that on which all beings depend and, at the 
same time, it is the measure and bound of everything 
(1966, I. 8 [51]. 2). 
According to what he states in his introductory 
remarks Plotinus, having defined what Good is, sub-
sequently examines what Evil is. As it is impossible 
to know what manifests itself as the very absence 
of Good (1966, I. 8 [51]. 2), the knowledge of Evil 
needs vision or removal (1966, I. 8 [51]. 9). As far 
as the object is concerned this corresponds to an 
understanding of it as a partial or absolute lack of 
good. Let us identify what that partial lack of good 
is. According to Plotinus, this corresponds to the 
partial lack of measure, form and order of beings 
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which appears, for instance, in cases such as sick-
ness, ugliness and poverty:
Illness is defect and excess of material bodies which 
do not keep order and measure; ugliness is matter not 
mastered by form; poverty is lack and deprivation of 
things which we need because of the matter with whi-
ch we are coupled, whose very nature is to be need.16 
(PLOTINUS, 1966, I. 8 [51]. 5)
As we can notice in Plotinus’ words the measure, 
form and order of beings are the principles of their 
goodness while Evil, on the contrary, corresponds 
to their partial lack.
Plotinus then analyses another concept of Evil, 
the absolute lack of good and of what originates 
its goodness. If Good corresponds to the highest 
perfection Evil, as its opposite, is the absolute lack 
of measure, form and order (1966, I. 8 [51]. 3).17 
Plotinus identifies such a concept of Evil with Mat-
ter which he now understands as what is absolutely 
devoid of measure –  therefore, as the non-being: 
“Yes, but evil is not in any sort of deficiency but in 
absolute deficiency; a thing which is only slightly 
deficient in good is not evil, for it can even be perfect 
on the level of its own nature. But when something 
is absolutely deficient –and this is matter- this is 
essential evil without any share in good” (Plotinus, 
1966, I. 8 [51]. 5).18 It is very important to stress 
that now Evil emerges at first as the non-being and, 
more specifically, as what is understood as Matter. 
At the same time we have to bear in mind that, ac-
cording to Plotinus, this concept of Evil is related 
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to the idea of it as a partial lack of being, and that 
these different notions of Evil need to be analyzed 
by examining their relationship.
Having defined the double meaning of the con-
cept of Evil Plotinus considers how Matter, as Evil 
itself, generates the other evils. As he identifies 
form as the principle of the goodness of beings 
Evil, as the lack of it, corresponds to the outcome 
of an alteration of their status. More specifically, the 
lack of goodness of beings corresponds in Plotinus’ 
analysis to the outcome of a deformation of realities 
caused by corruption (phthora), and the source of 
such a movement is identified with Matter: 
For matter masters what is imaged in it and corrupts and 
destroys it by applying its own nature which is contrary 
to form, not bringing cold to hot but putting its own 
formlessness to the form of heat and its shapelessness 
to the shape and its excess and defect to that which is 
measured, till it has made the form belong to matter 
and no longer to itself.19 (PLOTINUS, 1966, I. 8 [51]. 8)
It is important to stress that what we have noted 
as regards Evil, which is a partial or absolute lack 
of good, appears in Plotinus’ reflections concerning 
vices (1966, I. 8 [51]. 4-5),20 where intemperance 
and injustice turn out to be corruptions of the soul 
caused by Matter  (1966, I. 8 [51]. 12-14).
In the light of the results of the analysis concerning 
the Plotinian concept of Evil we can now consider 
their ontological-axiological pattern. As noticed in the 
reflections concerning the principles of the goodness 
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of beings, beings are good because they are endowed 
with measure, form and order which are, therefore, 
what generates their existence and perfection. If Evil 
as a partial lack of good is an alteration of form, 
then in its ontological pattern it corresponds to the 
non-being. Moreover, after defining Evil as a partial 
lack of good, Plotinus examines the movement of 
deformation of beings (phthora) to identify the source 
of such a lack of good. As the cause of that kind of 
movement he indicates Matter. Despite its absolute 
lack of form Matter is, and Plotinus identifies it with 
the non-being, understood not as the pure nothing 
but as the image of Being (eikon tou ontos).21 In the 
light of these reasons we can notice that in Plotinus’ 
analysis Evil corresponds to the non-being produced 
by corruption. This one now appears to be a result 
of the non-being. Hence Augustine’s and Plotinus’ 
respective ontological-axiological patterns display 
many similarities, but are at the same time different. 
In order to demonstrate this we need to examine the 
concept of matter as it emerges in Augustine’s and 
Plotinus’ reflections.
3. The concept of Matter in Plotinus and 
in Augustine
Although in both Plotinus and Augustine we 
can see an identification of evil and non-being, 
their ontological-axiological patterns are different. 
More precisely, this study has shown that Plotinus’ 
notion of non-being corresponds to the concept of 
Matter, while in Augustine’s reflections Evil is the 
non-being, simpliciter. An analysis of Plotinus’ and 
Augustine’s concept of Matter clarifies this difference. 
The Plotinian concept of Matter is visible in his defi-
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nition of Evil. For Plotinus Evil is the non-being and 
the non-being is Matter, an equivalence that merits 
further investigation. Plotinus indicates Evil as what 
is opposite to Good and as such is devoid of measure, 
form and order. He states that, as it is, Matter does 
not correspond to a being but to what is, without 
being endowed with an ontological pattern: 
So that which underlies figures and forms and shapes 
and measures and limits, decked out with an adornment 
which belongs to something else, having no good of its 
own, only a shadow in comparison with real being, is 
the substance of evil (if there really can be a substance 
of evil); this is what our argument discovers to be the 
primal evil, absolute evil.22 (PLOTINUS, 1966, I 8 [51] 3)
Evil corresponds therefore to the non-being; its 
absolute lack of measure, form and order shows at 
the same time that according to Plotinus these are 
the principles of the existence of beings. 
Having thus identified evil as non-being Plotinus 
considers the reason why Matter is evil. More pre-
cisely, considering why we can appropriately say 
that Matter, although devoid of quality, is evil, he 
remarks that it is like that exactly for its absolute 
lack of measure, form and order: “So, it [i.e. mat-
ter] is rightly said to be both without quality and 
evil; for it is not called evil because it has, but 
rather because it has not quality; so that perhaps 
it would not have been evil if it was a form instead 
of a nature opposed to form” (PLOTINUS, 1966, I. 
8 [51]. 10).23 Plotinus’ words suggest that Matter is 
evil because, as it is absolutely devoid of measure, 
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form and order, it is devoid of qualities. This allows 
us to acknowledge that Qualities derive from the 
principles of the goodness of beings.
As we can see from Plotinus’ reflections Matter, 
as what is absolutely devoid of measure, form and 
order, corresponds to the absolute lack of good – 
therefore, to Evil. Such a lack of goodness, produced 
by the absence of its principles, corresponds in the 
ontological dimension to the lack of existence of 
Matter. In the light of this we can state that, ac-
cording to Plotinus, Matter is at the same time the 
non-being and Evil: 
Indefiniteness and unmeasuredness and all the other 
characteristics which the evil nature has are contrary 
to the definition and measure and all the characteris-
tics present in the divine nature; so the whole, too, is 
contrary to the whole. The evil nature, too, has a false 
being, primary and absolute falsehood; the being of the 
divine is true being.24 (PLOTINUS, 1966, I. 8 [51]. 6)
We have to stress that measure, form and order, 
as the principles of existence, are the principles of 
goodness. This allows us to state that his ontological-
axiological pattern is based on them and that the 
idea of evil as both a partial and an absolute lack of 
goodness shows it. According to Plotinus, non-being 
is; therefore, the partial or absolute lack of good 
does not correspond to the non-being, simpliciter.
Instead Augustine’s concept of hyle, although 
it displays many similarities with the Plotinian 
idea of Matter, corresponds to a good and not to 
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Evil. At first Augustine characterizes hyle as what 
is absolutely devoid of form and, consequently, of 
quality.25 Both beings and their qualities derive 
from Matter: 
but I mean by hyle, as did the ancients, a sort of mat-
ter utterly formless and without qualities, and out of 
which are formed the qualities which we perceive. 
Hence wood, too, is called υλη in Greek, because it is 
suitable for artisans, not in being able itself to make 
anything, but as material out of which something can 
be made.26 (AUGUSTINE, 1955, 18)
It is important to emphasize that Augustine un-
derstands Matter to be, although formless, able to 
receive a form, and he considers this as Matter’s 
own nature: “Even this has the capacity for forms, 
since if it could not receive the form imposed by 
the artisan, it certainly would not be called matter” 
(Augustine, 1955, 18).27 So, according to Augustine, 
Matter is able to acquire a form and corresponds to 
the capacity itself to acquire existence and goodness. 
Although it is devoid of every principle of existence 
or perfection, Matter is; therefore, it is a good. More 
precisely, the capacity to receive form is the good 
with which Matter is endowed: “Furthermore, if form 
is a good, so that those who excel therein are called 
well-formed, as the beautiful are named from beauty, 
doubtless the capacity for form is likewise a good” 
(Augustine, 1955, 18).28 In the light of this we can 
conclude that in spite of similarities Augustine’s and 
Plotinus’ concepts of hyle are ontologically and axi-
ologically29 different. According to Augustine, Matter 
is indeed a good and a being. This therefore shows 
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that Evil corresponds to non-being, simpliciter, and 
that the Augustinian ontological-axiological pattern 
is different from the one of Plotinus. 
Conclusions
In the light of this analysis we can conclude that 
Plotinus’ and Augustine’s identification of evil and of 
the non-being initially displays a total correspond-
ence between the elements of their patterns. Indeed 
in both cases evil is the non-being produced by the 
corruption which is originated by the non-being. 
Nevertheless, although such similarities seem to 
indicate a complete identification between their 
ontological-axiological patterns, the analysis of 
the two philosophers’ respective notions of Matter 
clearly demonstrates that the Plotinian concept of 
the non-being is different from the Augustinian one. 
More specifically, whilst according to Plotinus the 
notion of the non-being corresponds to the concept 
of Matter as the absolute lack of ontological pattern, 
in Augustine the non-being is nothingness itself. It is 
very important to stress that the relationship between 
the Augustinian and Plotinian ontological-axiological 
pattern cannot be considered as a correspondence 
that only concerns their external features.
On the contrary, the concept of evil as a partial 
lack of good, as it appears both in Augustine’s and 
Plotinus’ reflections, shows at least in part a theo-
retical correspondence between the two philoso-
phers. Examining whether evil is or is not simply 
a lack of good, and in reality trying to show that 
it corresponds to Matter, Plotinus states: “But the 
nature which is opposed to all form is privation; 
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but privation is always in something else and has 
no existence by itself. So if evil consists in privation, 
it will exist in the thing deprived of form and have 
no independent existence” (PLOTINUS, 1966, I. 8 
[51]. 11).30 Such a concept of evil, which describes 
evils that affect beings,31 can be noticed as being 
sometimes expressed exactly in the same way32 in 
Augustine’s reflections.33 This therefore shows that 
Plotinus’ concept of evil as a partial lack of existence 
and goodness is part of the Augustinian notion of evil 
itself and that the Plotinian ontological-axiological 
pattern acts in Augustine´s reflections concerning 
evil (as the defectus boni) as their basic element.
Endnotes
1  As is well known, Augustine’s knowledge of Plotinus’ phi-
losophy is contested. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that what 
raises doubts is the exact determination of which Plotinian works he 
read, and not his knowledge of Plotinian Neoplatonism. CATAPANO 
(2006, p. CXXIII-CXXIV) wrote: “Il problema di quali fossero questi 
«libri di Platonici» letti da Agostino ha appassionato molto gli studiosi. 
Pare abbastanza evidente che essi coincidono almeno in parte con i Plotini 
paucissimi libri di beata v. i, 4. Sono state avanzate varie ipotesi circa il 
numero e l’identità dei trattati plotiniani in questione, ma l’assenza di 
citazioni letterali nei primi scritti agostiniani e di altre notizie sulla tradu-
zione fatta da Mario Vittorino pone un serio ostacolo alla trasformazione 
delle congetture in sicure certezze […] Si può comunque ritenere fuori 
discussione che tramite i «libri dei Platonici» Agostino abbia incontrato 
direttamente il neoplatonismo plotiniano (con cui forse era già venuto 
inconsapevolmente in contatto mediante certe omelie di Ambrogio) e 
porfiriano, e che questo incontro abbia segnato più di qualunque altro, sul 
piano filosofico, il suo pensiero.” On the relationship between Augustine’s 
and Plotinus’ concept of evil see: Bezançon (1965, p. 135); Rist (1974). 
2  See: “Summum bonum quo superius non est, Deus est; ac per 
hoc incommutabile bonum est; ideo vere aeternum et vere inmortale. 
Cetera omnia bona nonnisi ab illo sunt, sed non de illo. De illo enim 
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quod est, hoc quod ipse est; ab illo autem quae facta sunt, non sunt quod 
ipse. Ac per hoc, si solus ipse incommutabilis, omnia quae fecit, quia ex 
nihilo fecit, mutabilia sunt. Tam enim omnipotens est, ut possit etiam de 
nihilo, id est ex eo quod omnino non est, bona facere, et magna et parva, 
et caelestia et terrena, et spiritalia et corporalia.”
3  See: “Quia ergo bona omnia, sive magna sive parva, per 
quoslibet rerum gradus, non possunt esse nisi a  Deo; omnis autem 
natura, in quantum natura est, bonum est; omnis natura non potest 
esse nisi a summo et vero Deo.” 
4  See: “Nos enim catholici christiani Deum colimus, a quo omnia 
bona sunt seu magna seu parva, a quo est omnis modus sive magnus sive 
parvus, a quo omnis species sive magna sive parva; a quo omnis ordo, sive 
magnus sive parvus. Omnia enim quanto magis moderata, speciosa, ordi-
nata sunt, tanto magis utique bona sunt; quanto autem minus moderata, 
minus speciosa, minus ordinata sunt, minus bona sunt.” For a detailed 
discussion on Augustine’s concepts of measure, form and order see Bei-
erwaltes (1994, p. 143-157); Bettetini (1994, p. 125-222); La Bonnardière 
(1970); Reale (2001, p. 52-61); Roche (1941, p. 350-376).
5  See: “Haec tria ubi magna sunt, magna bona sunt; ubi parva 
sunt, parva bona sunt; ubi nulla sunt, nullum bonum est. Et rursus haec 
tria ubi magna sunt, magnae naturae sunt; ubi parva sunt, parvae naturae 
sunt; ubi nulla sunt, nulla natura est. Omnis ergo natura bona est.”
6  See: De Moribus Manichaeorum, II. 2. 2. 
7  See: De Genesi contra Manichaeos, I. 8.13.
8  See: “Proinde cum quaeritur unde sit malum, prius quaeren-
dum est quid sit malum. Quod nihil aliud est quam corruptio vel modi 
vel speciei vel ordinis naturalis.” On the similarities between Plotinus’ 
and Augustine’s reflections about the order of the analyses concerning 
Evil, see: Ennead, I. 8 [51]. 1.
9   See: De Natura Boni, 16.
10  See: “Corruptio autem si omnem modum, omnem speciem, 
omnem ordinem rebus corruptibilibus auferat, nulla natura remanebit.” 
See: De Natura Boni, 15; De Moribus Manichaeorum, II. 5.7-6.8. On 
Augustine’s reflections concerning the movement of corruption of 
modus, species and ordo see De Capitani (1980, p. 640-669; 1981, p. 
132-156); Di Silva (2015, p. 105-118); Müller (1986, p. 47-53). 
11  See: “Ideo ergo quocumque modo, quacumque specie, quocum-
que ordine sunt, quia Deus est a quo factae sunt; ideo autem non incom-
mutabiles sunt, quia nihil est unde factae sunt.” See: De Natura Boni, 1.
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12  See: “Creaturis autem praestantissimis, hoc est rationalibus 
spiritibus, hoc praestitit Deus, ut si nolint, corrumpi non possint, id 
est, si oboedientiam conservaverint sub Domino Deo suo ac sic incor-
ruptibili pulchritudini eius adhaeserint; si autem oboedientiam con-
servare noluerint quoniam volentes corrumpuntur in peccatis, nolentes 
corrumpantur in poenis.” See: De Natura Boni, 23; De libero Arbitrio, 
II. 20. 54.
13  See: De libero Arbitrio, II. 20. 54.
14  Translation by A.H. Armstrong.
15  See: “Ἀλλ’ εἰ, ὅτι tῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ γένοιτ’ ἂν ἐπιστήμη καὶ 
τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἐναντίον τὸ κακόν, ἥπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ἔσται, 
ἀναγκαῖον περὶ ἀγαθοῦ διιδεῖν τοῖς μέλλουσι τὰ κακὰ γνώσεσθται.”
16  See: Ἢ νόσον μὲν ἔλλειψιν καὶ ὑπερβολὴν σωμάτων ἐνύλων 
τάξιν καὶ μέτρον οὐκ ἀνεχομένων, αἶσχος δὲ ὕλην οὐ κρατηθεῖσαν 
εἴδει, πενίαν δὲ ἔνδειαν καὶ στέρησιν ὧν ἐν χρείᾳ ἐσμὲν διὰ τὴν ὕλην ᾗ 
συνεζεύγμεθα φύσιν ἔχουσαν χρησμοσύνην εἶναι.”
17  On the opposition between Good and Evil and on vision and 
removal as methodological way to know what the Evil is, see:  Ennead, 
I. 8 [51]. 6.
18  See: Ἢ οὐκ ἐν τῇ ὁπωσοῦν ἐλλείψει, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ παντελεῖ τὸ 
κακόν∙ τὸ γοῦν ἐλλεῖπον ὀλíγῳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐ κακόν, δύναται γὰρ καὶ 
τέλεον εἶναι ὡς πρὸς φύσιν τὴν αὑτοῦ.  Ἀλλ’ ὅταν παντελῶς ἐλλεί́πῃ, 
ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη, τοῦτο τὸ ὄντως κακὸν μηδεμίαν ἔχον ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν.” 
On the ontological status of Evil as non-being, see: Ennead, I. 8 [51]. 3. 
For the relationship between matter and evil see Chiaradonna (2009, 
p. 158-162); Corrigan (1996).
19  See: “Γενομένη γὰρ κυρία τοῦ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμφαντασθέντος 
ϕθείρει αὐτὸ καὶ διόλλουσι τὴν αὐτῆς παραθεῖσα φύσιν ἐναντίαν 
οὖσαν, οὐ τῷ τερμῷ τὸ ψυχρὸν προσφέρουσα, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει τοῦ 
θερμοῦ τὸ αὐτῆς ἀνεί́δεον προσάγουσα καὶ τὴν ἀμορφί́αν τῇ μορφῇ 
καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν τῷ μεμετρημένῳ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὸ ποιήσῃ 
αὐτῆς, ἀλλά μὴ αὐτοῦ ἔτι εἶναι”. O’MEARA (1999, p. 26) analyses 
more in depth the issue of matter as evil and as the origin of other 
evils: “L’argument de «l’unité d’une multiplicité» des premiers chapitres 
du traité qui conduit a l’existence d’un mal absolu, d’un mal en soi, la 
matière, distingue aussi de ce fait ce mal en soi de tout ce qui est mauvais 
en raison d’un quelconque rapport avec le mal en soi. Il s’agit des maux 
secondaires, les choses qui deviennent mauvaises par une participation 
ou une assimilation au mal en soi (3, 30-34; 8, 37-44). Ces choses sont 
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des maux «par accident», en raison d’une rapport avec le mal en soi, 
tout comme des êtres sont bons en raison de leur rapport avec le Bien.” 
For a detailed discussion on this topic see  O’Brien (1971, p. 113-146), 
(1996, p. 171-195); Narbonne (1994, p. 113-133); Rist (1961, p. 151-
164); Schäfer (2004, p. 266-294).
20  See: Ennead, I. 8 [51]. 8.
21  See: Ennead, I. 8 [51]. 3. 
22  See: “Τὴν δ’ὑποκειμένην σχήμασι καὶ εἴδεσι καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ 
μέτροις καὶ πέρασι καὶ ἀλλοτρί́ῳ κόσμῳ κοσμουμένην, μηδὲν παρ’ αὐτῆς 
ἀγαθὸν ἔχουσαν, εἴδωλον δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ ὄντα, κακοῦ δὴ οὐσί́αν, εἴ τις 
καὶ δύναται κακοῦ οὐσί́α εἶναι, ταύτην ἀνευρί́σκει ὁ λόγος κακὸν εἶναι 
πρῶτον καὶ καθ’αὑτὸ κακόν.” See: Ennead, I. 8 [51]. 5-6.
23  See: “Ὀρθῶς ἄρα λέγεται καὶ ἄποιος εἶναι καὶ κακή∙ οὐ γὰρ 
λέγεται κακὴ τῷ ποιότητα ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῷ ποιότητα μὴ ἔχειν, 
ἵνα μὴ ἦν ἴσως κακὴ εἶδος οὖσα, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐναντία τῷ εἴδει φύσις.”
24  See: “Πέρατι δὴ καὶ μέτρῳ καὶ [τὰ ἄλλά,] ὅσα ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ 
θεί́ᾳ φύσει, ἀπειρί́α καὶ ἀμετρί́α καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἔχει ἡ κακὴ φύσις, 
ἐναντία∙ ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῷ ὅλῳ ἐναντίον. Καὶ τὸ εἶναι δὲ ψευδόμενον 
ἔχει καὶ πρώτος καὶ ὄντως ψεῦδος∙ τῷ δὲ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθῶς εἶναι”.
25  On Plotinus’ reflections concerning Matter and Qualities, see: 
Ennead I. 8 [51]. 10-11.
26  See: “sed hylen dico quandam penitus informem et sine quali-
tate materiem, unde istae quas sentimus qualitates formantur, ut antiqui 
dixerunt. Hinc enim et sylva greace υλη dicitur, quod operantibus apta 
sit, non ut aliquid ipsa faciat, sed unde aliquid fiat.”
27  See: “Habet enim et ipsa capacitatem formarum; nam si capere 
impositam ab artifice formam non posset, nec materies utique diceretur.”
28  See: “Porro si bonum aliquod est forma, unde quia ea prae-
valent formosi appellantur, sicut a specie speciosi, procul dubio bonum 
aliquid est etiam capacitas formae; sicut quia bonum est sapientia, nemo 
dubitat quod bonum sit capacem esse sapientiae”. According to Augus-
tine, if Matter is good, it is God’s creature (De Nat. Boni, 18). It is very 
important to stress that the goodness of Matter allows us to solve the 
problem concerning its origin, as it emerges in Plotinus’ reflections 
(see:  Ennead, I. 8 [51]. 7).
29  As for the problems related to the Augustinian concept of 
Matter, that is its ontological-axiological state, see: Conf. XII. 1.1-13.16.
30  See: “Ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐναντία τῷ εἴδει παντὶ φύσις στέρησις· 
στέρησις δὲ ἀεὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς οὐχ ὑπόστασις· ὥστε τὸ 
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κακὸν εἰ ἐν στερήσει, ἐν τῷ ἐστερημένῳ εἴδους τὸ κακὸν ἔσθαι· 
ὥστε καθ’ἑαυτὸ οὐκ ἔσθαι.” On the notion of evil as substance, see: 
Ennead, I. 8 [51]. 3.
31  See: Ennead, I. 8 [51]. 1.
32  See: De Natura Boni, 14-15; 21; 23.
33  See: De Natura Boni, 17. 
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